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Can Compensation be Claimed under the Standard Commercial 
Land and Building Contract Where the Property Sold has no 
Legally Enforceable Vehicular Access? 
 
This was the question that confronted Wilson J in Jarema Pty Ltd v Michihiko 
Kato [2004] QSC 451. 
 
Facts 
 
The plaintiff was the buyer of a commercial property at Bundall.  The property 
comprised a 6 storey office building with a basement car park with 54 car parking 
spaces.  The property was sold for $5 million with the contract being the standard 
REIQ/QLS form for Commercial Land and Buildings (2nd ed GST reprint).  The 
contract provided for a “due diligence” period.  During this period, the buyer’s 
solicitors discovered that there was no direct access from a public road to the car 
park entrance.  Access to the car park was over a lot of which the Gold Coast 
City Council was the registered owner under a nomination of trustees, the 
Council holding the property on trust for car parking and town planning purposes. 
 
Due to the absence of a registered easement over the Council’s land, the buyer’s 
solicitors sought a reduction in the purchase price.  The seller would not agree to 
this.  Finally the sale was completed with the buyer reserving its rights to seek 
compensation. 
 
Issue 
 
Clause 8 of the contract was in the following terms — 
 
ERRORS AND MISDESCRIPTIONS.  
 
8.1  
 
If there is any immaterial mistake or error in the description or particulars 
of the Property or as to title, the Purchaser shall not be entitled to 
terminate this Contract but shall be entitled to such compensation (if 
demanded in writing on or before the Date for Completion) as the case 
may require. The Purchaser shall not be entitled to delay completion or to 
withhold any part of the Purchase Price by reason of any such claim for 
compensation.  
 
8.2  
 
If there is any material mistake or error in the description or particulars of 
the Property or as to title and the Purchaser does not exercise any right 
which the Purchaser has at law to terminate this Contract, the Purchaser 
shall be entitled to such compensation (if demanded in writing on or before 
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the Date for Completion) as the case may require. The Purchaser shall not 
be entitled to delay completion or to withhold any part of the Purchase 
Price by reason of any such claim for compensation. 
 
For the buyer, it was contended that there was a mistake or error in the 
description or particulars of the property within the meaning of clause 8, namely 
the omission to state that there was no legally enforceable vehicular access to 
the car park.  It was common ground that if there was such a mistake or error, 
the buyer would be entitled to compensation in the amount of $85,000. 
 
Decision 
 
In dismissing the claim, Wilson J held that the property sold was accurately 
described in the contract and that there was no error or misdescription giving rise 
to a right to compensation within clause 8.  In reaching this conclusion, Wilson J 
referred to the decisions of the High Court in Travinto Nominees Pty Ltd v Vlattas 
(1973) 129 CLR 1 and Handley JA in Batey v Gifford (1997) 42 NSWLR 710.   
 
Although clause 8 of the standard REIQ/QLS form for Commercial Land and 
Buildings (2nd ed GST reprint) is wider than the clause considered by the High 
Court in Travinto Nominees Pty Ltd v Vlattas (due to the addition of the 
contractual words “or as to title”) this difference was not material in this case as it 
was not contended that there was a mistake or error as to title.  For this reason, 
the finding of the High Court that an error or misdescription of “property” must 
relate to the physical subject matter was apposite. 
 
In Batey v Gifford the facts were not materially dissimilar to those confronting 
Wilson J in this instance.  A track providing access to a property sold was owned 
by the Road and Traffic Authority with the contract of sale not disclosing these 
access difficulties.  Handley JA rejected a submission that non-disclosure of the 
access difficulties constituted an “error or misdescription” saying — 
 
 I do not see in the contract any statement as to the property’s accessibility by person or 
 vehicle. In this regard the description set forth on the front page … is an accurate 
 statement of what was being sold. 
 
For the buyer, an attempt was made to distinguish the contract under 
consideration in Batey v Gifford.  Counsel for the buyer referred to clause 21.1(b) 
of the standard REIQ/QLS form for Commercial Land and Buildings (2nd ed GST 
reprint) which is in the following terms — 
 
 PROPERTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED  
  
 21.1  
  
 If it is established that at the date of this Contract:  
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 (b)  
 the access to the Land is other than by way of an adjoining road dedicated 
 for public use as a road or by way of a registered easement to a road 
 dedicated for public use;  
 and any such facts are not disclosed in this Contract the Purchaser may 
 by notice in writing to the Vendor given on or before the Date for 
 Completion terminate this Contract. 
 
It was submitted that the presence of clause 21.1(b) in this instance gave rise to 
an implication in the description of the property that there was access to the land 
by way of a dedicated road or a registered easement to a dedicated road.  This 
submission was not accepted by Wilson J on the basis that clauses 8 and 21.1 
deal with quite separate matters.  It does not follow from the fact that clause 
21.1(b) gives a right to terminate a contract if access was other than by way of an 
adjoining road dedicated for public use or by way of a registered easement to a 
road dedicated for public use that if access is other than by such a road or 
easement, that there is an error or misdescription giving rise to a compensation 
claim under clause 8. 
 
Comment 
 
The decision of Wilson J in Jarema Pty Ltd v Michihiko Kato is illustrative of the 
care that must be exercised when considering the operation of clauses in the 
standard contract.  The availability of a contractual right to terminate will not 
necessarily equate to a right to seek compensation.  The buyer could have 
elected to terminate the contract under clause 21.1(b) (or in this instance, 
presumably under the terms of the “due diligence” provision) and then sought to 
renegotiate a new contract at a lower price to reflect the fact that there was no 
legally enforceable vehicular access to the car park of the building.  However, 
having elected to proceed with the settlement, there was no entitlement to 
compensation under standard clause 8 as there was no mistake or error in the 
description or particulars of the property. 
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